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Ng: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Act)! to restore and maintain the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."s To meet
this objective, Congress required that by 1985 no pollution be
discharged into navigable waters. 8 Congress also authorized the
Environmental Protection Agency (the Agency) to implement
the Act' by allowing the Agency to establish, among other
things, limitations on various pollutants15 and commence projects
without filing environmental impact statements.6 This past
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376, as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977,33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1376 (1976). For an exhaustive discussion of the Act, see H. LIEBER, FEDERALISM
AND CLEAN WATER (1975). See also R. HAruus, W. JEFFERY & B. STEWART, JR., INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS-A GUIDE TO WATER POLLUTION AND WATER SCARCITY
(1974); R. MIDDLEKAUFF, WATER QUALITY CONTROL LEGISLATION (1975); L SLOAN, ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1979).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
3. [d. § 1251(a}(1).
4. [d. § 1251(d).
5. Section 301(b) of the Act provides that:
[T]here shall be achieved
(l)(A) not later than July 1,1977, effluent limitations for point
sources. • • which require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available as defined by the
Administrator • • • •
(2)(A) [not later than July 1, 1983,] ••• effluent limitations
for categories and classes of point sources • • • which shall require application of the best available technology economically
achievable • • • with regulations issued by the Administrator
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976).
In this Note, the Environmental Protection Agency and its Administrator will be
referred to as "the Agency."
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (1976). Section 51I(e) of the Act requires the Agency to file
an environmental impact statement where it grants either federal funds to help build a
publicly owned treatment works or a permit for a new source of pollution. "Permit"
refers to a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342
"(1976).
"
An environmental impact statement must be filed for any "major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, § 102 (2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). For a survey of recent
Ninth Circuit cases on the environmental impact statement, see Note, 10 GOLDEN GATE

225

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 8

226

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:225

term, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined the
Agency's power under both of these provisions.

In Association of Pacific Fisheries v. Environmental Protection Agency,7 the Ninth Circuit upheld all except one of the
methods the Agency required for the seafood processing industry to reduce the amount of pollution discharged. In Kilroy v.
Quarles, 8 the Ninth Circuit limited instances in which the
Agency had to prepare an environmental impact statement. This
Note will first examine the facts and legal arguments of each
case. Then congressional intent evidenced through legislative
history will be explored. Finally, the Ninth Circuit decisions will
be measured against th.e expressed intent of Congress.
I. METHODS TO REDUCE POLLUTANTS DISCHARGED

In Association of Pacific Fisheries, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Agency's requirement for two methods of pollution reduction, and found a third method inadequtely supported by the
evidence. In 1974, the Agency promulgated levels to which pollution must be reduced (pollution limitations) for the seafood
processing industry.9 Pursuant to section 301 of the Act,to the
Agency set pollution limitations for 1977 and additional limitations for 1983. The Agency then determined methods by which
processing plants could best comply with the required
limitations.
In determining its methods, the Agency distinguished
U. L. REv. 205 (1980).
7. 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Kennedy, J.; the other panel members were
Sneed and Trask, J.J.).
8. 614 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were Tang,
J. and Campbell, D.J., sitting by designation).
9. 615 F.2d at 801-02. The Agency promulgated the guidelines in two phases. The
first phase affected catfish, crab, shrimp, and tuna. 40 C.F.R. §§ 408.10-408.16 (1980).
The second phase affected fish meal, salmon, bottomfish, claim, oyster, sardine, scallop,
herring fillet and abalone. 40 C.F.R. §§ 408.160-408.196, 408.290-408.296, 408.310-408.326
(1980). Within each subcategory, the Agency set limitations measured by biological oxygen demand (BOD.), total suspended solids (TSS), and oil and grease (O&G). BOD. is a
measure of the oxygen-conswning potential of organic matter in the efHuent. TSS is a
measure of the quality of undissolved solid matter suspended in the efHuent. O&G describes the volume of naturally occurring fish oil in the efHuent. See 615 F.2d at 802 n.2.
Water that comes into contact with fish residue (for example, heads, tails, and internal
organs) is measured against each of these limitations. The regulations set average
monthly and daily levels.
10. See note 5 supra.
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processing plants near "population or processing centers"ll from
those further away, and decided that plants near those centers
must screen the larger particles out and dispose of them by
transporting them to sanitary landfills, to other facilities for further processing, or to approved disposal sites at sea. I2 The plants
away from the centers must only grind the solids prior to discharge. The Agency based its determination on two factors:
costs, and an independent evaluation of the data.
The Agency found operation, maintenance, and waste disposal costs considerably lower for plants near population centers
due to the availability of power and workers, and lower for
plants near processing centers due to shared disposal costs. IS
Consequently, the Agency decided that these plants could afford
more expensive methods of reducing pollution. The Agency also
used a model plant and established that the plants could reduce
pollution to the'1977 levels with the required methods. 14
The Agency prescribed two methods for plants located near
centers to meet the 1983 limitations. One method employed dissolved air flotation units which funnel pressurized air into tanks
where solids are immersed in water. The air buoys the solid particles up, allowing them to be skimmed off and used as either
animal feed or fertilizer.lI~ The other method employed aerated
lagoons consisting of shallow ponds. The pollutant, dumped into
the ponds, is left there for up to fifty days, during which time it
is biologically broken down. IS Plants located away from population or processing centers need only screen solids out prior to
discharge. I ?
Again the Agency used the cost of compliance and an independent determination of the data to establish that these were
11. 615 F.2d at 803. The Agency defined population or processing centers as "including but not limited to Anchorage, Cordova, Juneau, Ketchikan, Kodiak, and Petersburg •... " See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 408.162 (1980). The Agency, further characterized
"processing centers" as areas where multiple plants are located. 615 F.2d at 804.
12. 615 F.2d at 803.
13. ld. at 804. The Agency also found construction costs of waste disposal sites more
expensive to plants away from population centers because of rugged terrain. ld.
14. ld. at 809.
15. ld. at 816.
16. ld. at 819.
17. ld. at 802.
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the best methods for the plants to meet the 1983 limitations.
Cost considerations included capital costs and operation and
maintenance costs. IS The independent determination was a single study which determined that these methods would best meet
the desired goal.
The Association of Pacific Fisheries (the Association), a
trade organization of fish canners and processors, challenged the
1977 regulations on botTrl cost and independent study determination grounds. First, the· Association argued that the Agency
based costs on an unsubstantiated distinction determined by
plant location.19 The Association further claimed that the
Agency failed to adequately weigh the incremental benefits
which would result frOom increased costs and that the Agency
failed to consider all the relevant costs.20 Second, the Association challenged the accuracy and adequacy of the data the
Agency used to detemline the pollution limitations.21 In addition, the Association questioned whether the 1983 limitations
were, as the statute mandated, "available [and] economically
achievable"22 through oither the dissolved air flotation unit28 or
the aerated lagoon2' method.

A.

SCREENING

Cost Factors

The Association argued that the Agency's distinction between processing plants near population or processing centers
and those further away from such centers was not supported by
the evidence and that the Agency's designation of the cities as
population centers was arbitrary.2~ The Ninth Circuit rejected
both arguments, holding that the record sufficiently supported
the much lower construction, operation, and maintenance costs
of plants near population or processing centers compared to
those further away.26 The Ninth Circuit also decided that the
18. [d. at 818.
19. [d. at 803-04.

20.
21.
22.
23.

[d. at S06-09.
[d. at S09-10, S12.
See note 5 supra.
615 F.2d at S16.
24. [d. at S19.
25. [d. at S04-05.
26. [d. at S04. For example, the record indicated that measuring all construction
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Agency had substantial discretion to determine what constituted
a population center.2'1
The Association also challenged the adequacy of the
Agency's consideration of increased benefits from increased
costs. Again, the Ninth Circuit found such considerations within
the Agency's discretion. 2s Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit determined that the Association's focus on improved water quality
was misdirected. Prior to the 1972 Act, the emphasis was on improved water quality. With the Act, however, the focus shifted
to regulating pollution before it is discharged into water and affects its quality. Consequently, the court rejected the improved
water quality standard.29
Next, the Association argued that screening and dumping
pollutants into specific sites in the ocean and grinding and
dumping it near the shoreline had the same polluting effect.SO
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that dumping screened solids
into the ocean was only one of several alternatives,81 that higher
tidal activity further away from the shoreline aids dispersion of
screened solids, and that improved water quality near the shoreline is itself a benefit.82
Finally, the Ninth Circuit set aside the Association's claim
that compliance was impractical because an excessive number of
costs against a standardized scale, population centers such as Anchorage and Juneau had
cost factors of 1.5 and 1.6 respectively. Conversely, plants located away from such centers had a higher cost factor of 2.5. [d. The record also supported the distinction based
on operation and maintenance costs. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
27. 615 F.2d at 805.
28. [d. The Ninth Circuit supported its position with the Conference Report on the
bill which precedea the Act. The report found the balance between costs and benefits to
be where added benefits are "wholly out of proportion to the costs." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, A LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL Ac:r AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at 170 (1973) [hereinafter cited as L.H.}.
The United States Supreme Court, in Environmental Protection Agency v. National
Crushed Stone Assoc., 101 S. Ct. 295 (1980), supported this Agency discretion. It stated
that 1977 limitations are a "conclusion by the [Agency} that the costs imposed on the
industry are worth the benefits in pollution reduction that will be gained by meeting
those limits." [d. at 303.
29. 615 F.2d at 805. See I. SLOAN, ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW 23-28 (2d ed. 1979).
30. 615 F.2d at 806.
31. [d.
32. [d. at 807.
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plants would close due to the limitations.33 The court decided
that the price increase, not the number of plants closing, determined the practicality of compliance.34 The Ninth Circuit found
the price increase insignificant,31S and adopted the Agency's conclusion that the 1977 limitations were economically practical.3s
Data Considered

Having found that the Agency adequately considered costs
of compliance through the screening methods, the Ninth Circuit
then addressed the Ansociation's second major argument: that
the Agency failed to ad.equately consider the data used to set the
1977 limitations. The Agency based its 1977 limitations on a
model plant which it constructed with processing data from 1973
and financial data from 1968 to 1972.37 The Association claimed
that using processing data from 1973, an unproductive season,
caused the Agency to underestimate the amount of fish
processed per hour.3s The Agency responded that even if production was underestimated, any effect it had was minimal because processing costs increased at a much slower rate than the
amount processed did.89 For example, a plant that processed ten
times more fish than another plant only had an increased cost of
1.4 times.40 The Ninth Circuit refused to disturb the Agency's
determination because the Agency adequately considered all the
information before it;1I1
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Association's attempt to in33. Id. at 808. The Association based its argument on an Agency-conducted study
which predicted that 7 of 16 plants would close because of the new limitations. Id.
34. Id. at 808-09.
35. Id. The Agency projected price increases to range from 0.3% to 0.5%.
36. Id. at 809.
37.Id.
38. Id. at 809-10. For processing data, the Agency used a 42 day average processing
season, although the Association claimed that 14 to 30 days was more accurate. The
Agency also used an average working day of 18 hours, although the Association claimed
that an 18-hour work day was rare. Finally, the Agency determined that large processors
processed about 8.3 tons per hour, medium processors, 5.0 tons, and small processors, 1.1
tons, although the Association claimed 40, 20, and 10 tons, respectively, was more
accurate.
39. Id. at 810.
40.Id.
41. Id. at 810-11. The Ninth Circuit decided that some variation may be allowed
within a subcategory. Id. (citing American Iron & Steel Inst. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977».
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troduce independent studies conducted after the Agency set the
pollution limitations}2 The Ninth Circuit said it would only consider studies which showed "that the Agency proceeded upon assumptions that were entirely fictional or utterly without scientific support. "43
The Ninth Circuit refused to question the Agency's decision
to stress water and waste management practices when it determined attainable limitations}4 Instead, the court found sufficient evidence in the record to support the Agency's emphasis
on water management practices4G and held that the Agency had
the power to recommend dry cleanup methods46 to improve
those practices. 4'1
After rejecting all of the Association's challenges to the 1977
limitations, the court addressed the Association's attacks on the
dissolved air flotation unit and aerated lagoon methods for the
1983 limitations.
42. 615 F.2d at 811-12.
43. ld. at 812. The Ninth Circuit enumerated several alternatives by which the Association could have challenged the limitations. Firat, the Association could have filed for
reconsideration of its original action under appropriate circumstances. In OIjato Chapter
of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the circuit court suggested that
when a revision of the limitations is sought, a petition should be submitted to the
Agency. The petitioner also could have filed supporting material explaining why the limitations should be changed. If denied, the petitioner then could have sought judicial review. ld. at 666.
.
Next, the Association could have applied for a variance under § 301(c) of the Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). Third, the Association could have challenged the limitations
during the annual revision required by § 304(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976).
Finally, the Association could have challenged the limitations at the five year review
required by § 301(d) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 131l(d) (1976).
44. 615 F.2d at 813. The Association maintained that the Agency should have considered the species and sexual maturity of the fish processed, the level of mechanization
of each plant, and the condition of the fish when delivered to the plant. ld. The Agency
responded that poor water management practices, including continuous use of water
hoses to wash areas of waste buildup, excessive use of water when not processing fish, use
of outdated machines which require more water to operate and use of water during rest
breaks, were the major causes of pollution variability. ld. at 813-14.
45. ld. at 815. The Agency cited two studies which estimated that about 20 to 30%
of the water use occurred during cleanup operations and was responsible for about 10 to
20% of the total pollution. ld.
46. ld. at 815-16. Dry cleanup methods include shoveling solid waste into bins
before water cleanup and using conveyor belts instead of water to transport waste. ld. at
615.
47. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Association's claim that dry cleanup methods
required in-plant changes. The court found no such changes in the model plant on which
the Agency based its recommendation. ld. at 815.
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FLOTATION UNITS

Cost Factor
The Association first argued that. the 1983 limitations must
be based on the incrE~ased benefits resulting from increased
costs.48 The Ninth Circuit noted that in 1977 cost calculations,
the benefits must be considered in relation to costs although the
Agency had discretion to determine where added costs did not
yield adequate benefits.49 The court then found that for the 1983
cost considerations the Agency must only include costs in its calculations without determining its relation to benefits.50 The
Ninth Circuit decided that the Agency fulfilled the statutory
mandate for the dissolved air flotation units because it considered the costs of construction, labor, power, chemicals, and
fue1. 51

Data Considerations
The Association argued that the Agency's 1983 limitations
for dissolved air flotation units were arbitrary and capricious because they were based on a single study.52 The Ninth Circuit
found that Congress did not intend to require more than one
study for setting 1983llimitations.5s Consequently, the court held
48. The Association repeated the arguments it made for computing costs for 1977
limitations. See text accompanying note 28 8upra.
49. 615 F.2d at 817-18. The Ninth Circuit recogni2ed the relative costs and benefit
considerations mandated by the language of § 304(b)(1)(B) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1314(b)(1)(B) (1976). The legislative history of the Act, however, expressed the intent
that the Agency should "limit the application of technology only where the additional
degree of efHuent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs . . . ." L.H. at 170
(emphasis added).
50. 615 F.2d at 817-18. Again, the court examined the statutory language and found
no requirement to weigh costs against benefits. Section 304(b)(2)(B) of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(2)(B) (1976). Instead, the court found evidence to the contrary in legislative
history. There the committee said that the 1983 limitations must be determined "without regard to cost." L.H. at 170. The Ninth Circuit also cited Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in which the court only required the Agency to
consider costs along with other factors.
51. 615 F.2d at 818. Land costs were not considered because the amount of land
needed was minimal. Id.
52. Id. at 816. The study, conducted by the British Columbia Seafood Industry and
the Canadian Fisheries Research Board, determined that the dissolved air flotation units
reduced BOD6 by 80%, TSS by 90%, and O&G by 95%. Id.
53. Id. at 816. The House Report declared that "one operating facility which demonstrates that the level can be achieved" is sufficient for setting guidelines. L.H. at 798.
The Ninth Circuit added that all the Agency must show is that the best existing dissolved air flotation unit can meet the limitations. The study the Agency relied on showed
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that the Agency adequately determiited that plants using dissolved air flotation units could meet 1983 limitations. G4
C.

AERATED LAGOONS

Costs Factors
The Association argued that the Agency failed to consider
all the costs for aerated lagoons. The Court agreed that the
Agency failed to consider land acquisition costs. ISIS The Ninth
Circuit decided that although the Agency did not have to consider land acquisition costs for dissolved air flotation units because of the minimal land needed, the court held that the
Agency must consider this cost for aerated lagoons which require
much larger areas of land.1S8 Consequently, the court remanded
this portion of the Agency's decision for reevaluation.1S7

Data Considerations
Finally, the Association argued that the Agency's single
study which supported aerated lagoons failed to adequately
prove that plants using this method could obtain the 1983 limitations. The Ninth Circuit agreed and found the study inadequate.ISS The Ninth Circuit remanded the aerated lagoons
method to the Agency for further data as well as cost determinations, but affirmed the Agency's decisions in all other respects.1S9
that for salmon, the dissolved air flotation unit can reduce BOD. by 80%, TSS by 90%
and O&G by 95%.615 F.2d at 816. Additional studies involving other fish showed substantial reduction in all three subcategories. ld. at 816-17.
54. ld. at 818.
55. ld. at 819.
56. ld. at 820. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Agency's reliance on American Iron &
Steel Inst. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1027 (3rd Cir. 1976), modified
on other grounds, 560 F.2d 589 (1977), in which the court held that the costs of land
should not be considered because of its variability depending on quality. The Association of Pacific Fisheries court reasoned that because the cost of screening and other
required changes which also vary with the quality of land were considered in costs calculations, land acquisition costs should also be considered. 615 F.2d at 820.
57. 615 F.2d at 820.
58. ld. at 819. The study failed to show the analytical approach the Agency used or
the possibility that aerated lagoons would be used for more than limited types of seafood. Furthermore, the study failed to illustrate the effectiveness of the lagoons. ld.
59. ld. at 820.
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II. EXEMPTION FROM FILING AN ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATE!vIENT
In Kilroy v. Quarles,60 the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed
section 511(c) of the Act, which exempts the agency from preparing an environmental impact statement (Statement) in certain situations.61 Los Angeles owns and operates the Hyperion
Wastewater Treatment Plant.62 Until 1975, the plant applied
primary treatment63 to about two-thirds of its sewage and secondary treatment to the rest. 64 Mter treatment, the solid waste is
separated from the liquid waste. The plant then discharges the
liquid waste into the ocean five miles from shore, and the solid
waste (or sludge), seven miles out.6~
In 1975, however, the Agency ordered Hyperion to apply
secondary treatment to all pollution before discharge and to stop
the discharge of sludge.66 The Agency did not have a final plan
for disposal of the sludge, and so it designed an interim plan as a
condition to the renewal of Hyperion's permit to discharge pollution.67 The interim lplan required the plant to separate the
sludge from the water and to transport the sludge to a sanitary
landfill.68 To help effectuate the interim plan, the Agency intended to award Hyperion a federal grant.69
60. 614 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980).
61. See note 6 supra.
62. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Quarles, 440 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D.C. Cal. 1977). Because the Kilroy COurt'8 recapitulation of the facts is inadequate, facts are taken from
the district court's decision.
63. 40 C.F.R. § 125.58{m) (1980) define8 primary treatment as "the first stage in
wastewater treatment where substantially all floating or settleable solids, are removed by
flotation and/or sedimentation."
64. 440 F. Supp. at 318. 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (1980) defines secondary treatment as
that treatment through which "the minimum level of effluent quality. . . in terms of the
parameters - biological oxygen demand, suspended solids and pH" can be attained.
65. 440 F. Supp. at 318.
66. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle, 586 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1978). Pacific
Legal Foundation v. Costle was factually the same as Pacific Legal Foundation v.
Quarles. Costle, however, raised different issues which the Supreme Court subsequently
reversed in Costle v. Pacific )i..egal Foundation, 100 S. Ct. 1095 (1980). The Supreme
Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in requiring the Agency to hold a public hearing
on every § 402 (permit) decision without first finding a material fact in dispute. See note
6 supra. Instead, the Court fOlmd that § 402 of the Act only requires an "opportunity for
[a] public hearing." 100 S. Ct. at 1105 (emphasis added) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342{a){1)
(1976».
67. 440 F. Supp. at 319.
68. ld.
69. ld.
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Plaintiffs, three sometime members of the Los Angeles City
Council, one Los Angeles property owner, and the city of Torrance, argued that the Agency's plan would force Los Angeles to
finance a project which would adversely affect the land without
any prior determination that the land was a better receptacle for
the sludge than the ocean. They sued on two bases.70 They
sought an injunction against commencement of the interim plan
until the Agency filed a Statement, as the National Evnironmental Policy Act of 1969 (the Policy Act) requires of all "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the human environment."71 Plaintiffs also sued the Agency for a second Statement,
arguing that the Agency's declared national policy against ocean
disposal of sludge itself constituted a "major Federal action."72
The district court decided that the Agency's action in either case
was exempt from the Statement requirement.73 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed and adopted the rationale of the district
COurt.74 Consequently, arguments and holdings will be referenced to the district court's opinion.

Injunction Denied
Plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction against commencement of the interim plan until the Agency filed a Statement.
They argued that under section 511(c) of the Act,75 any grant of
federal funds to help construct a publicly owned sewage treatment works required a Statement.78 The Agency agreed, and
promised not to grant the funds until a Statement was com70. Id. at 320. The district court dismissed plaintiff's third cause of action-that
ocean disposal be considered as an alternative-as improperly raised. Under this claim,
plaintiffs argued that the Agency exceeded the scope of the Act by regulating the dumping of sludge from vessels beyond the territorial seas. Consequently, plaintiffs contended
the exemption statute no longer insulated the no-sludge policy.
The court found that because plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief to prohibit
sludge dumping from vessels, the claim raised was limited to the Agency's consideration
of vessel dumping of sludge as an alternative to land disposal. After so limiting the cause
of action, the court held that the Agency need not consider the vessel dumping alternative. 440 F. Supp. at 327. This holding was not appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
71. [d. See note 6 supra. Los Angeles argued that under § 51l(c)(1) of the Act the
funding of a publicly owned treatment plant constituted a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. See note 6 supra.
72. 440 F. Supp. at 321.
73. [d. at 320, 326.
74. 614 F.2d at 227.
75. See note 6 supra.
76. 440 F. Supp. at 320.
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pleted. Plaintiffs argued that that was not enough because the
Agency required Los Angeles to commence the interim plan with
its share of the funds.'17 The district court found that the language of the exemption statute set forth two situations in which
the Agency had to prepare a Statement. 7S Neither situation,
however, applied to the interim plan and the court decided that
the Agency acted within its discretion when it required Los Angeles to commence construction of the sanitary landfill before
the federal funds were available.79
No Statement Required for the Declared National Policy
The Agency endorsed a national policy to eliminate all
ocean disposal of sludge.so This endorsement, plaintiffs argued,
constituted a "major Federal action" within the meaning of the
Policy Act for which the Agency must prepare a Statement.
Plaintiffs reasoned that only section 403 of the ActS1 regulated
ocean disposal of pollution and that it did not authorize the
Agency to declare tho 'national policy. Because section 511(c) of
the Act only exempts Agency actions which are within the Act,
plaintiffs concluded that the Agency acted beyond its power
under the Act by declaring the policy and could not use section
511(c) to bypass the Statement requirement.s2 In response, the
Agency argued that the language of section 301 of the Act implied that the Agency had the power to declare the policy.sS
This issue was one of first impression, therefore the district
court based most of its discussion on the legislative history of
sections 301 and 403. The court determined that Congress intended section 301 to regulate ocean disposal of pollution,tl" that
section 403 merely supplement section 301 where section 301 did
77. [d. The Act allows the federal government to fund up to 75% of the cost of
constructing a treatment works; the individual entity must pay the rest. 33 U.S.C. §
1282(a)(1) (1976).
78. See note 6 supra.
79. 440 F. Supp. at 320. The district court decided that a construction schedule for
the interim plan was a condition of renewing Hyperion's permit and could be classified
as neither an Agency grant of federal funds nor a permit for a new pollution source. [d.
80. 440 F. Supp. at 321.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
82. 440 F. Supp. at 321.
83. The Agency pointed to § 301 of the Act where all publicly owned sewage treatment works must apply secondary treatment to sludge. 40 C.F.R. § 133 (1980) defines
secondary treatment as the elimination of sludge discharge. 440 F. Supp. at 332.
84. 440 F. Supp. at 326.
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not go far enough,85 and that, even it section 301 did not regulate ocean disposal of pollution, the Agency still had the power
under section 403 to declare the policy.88 The district court concluded that the Agency was exempt from preparing a Statement
under section 511(c) for its declared national policy against
ocean disposal'of sludge.87

Congressional Intent
To determine how Congress intended section 301 of the Act
to be construed, Congress expected the focus to be on section
304,88 which lists factors the Agency must consider to set permissible pollution levels for 1977 and 1983. For 1977 limitations,
section 304(b)(1)(B) required the Agency to compare the total
cost of implementing a technology to the resulting benefits.89
The Agency, however, has discretion to determine within this
cost-benefit analysis the point at which added benefits do not
justify the added costs.90 By so limiting the cost-benefit analysis,
the Agency can maintain uniform pollution limitations within a
class or category of pollution sources. 91
In addition to these cost factors, section 304(b)(1)(B) requires the Agency to consider such other factors as the age of
equipment and facilities, the development of present and future
technology, and "engineering aspects" required to apply the new
technology. The Agency's consideration of such data, however,
need not be limited to studies or other information provided by
the polluter.92 Instead, the Agency can use its own resources to
compile and interpret data for the pollution limitations.
For 1983 limitations, section 304(b)(2)(B) also allows the
Agency to independently consider all the above data. Congress
85. ld. at 323, 326.
86. ld. at 326.
87.ld.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976).
89. ld. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976).
90. In one case, American Petroleum Inst. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 540
F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976), the court only required that the Agency conduct a serious
and comprehensive 8tudy of compliance costs. After so doing, the Agency then has discretion to select the point of diminishing returns. ld. at 1038.
91. L.H. at 170. The required technology for the 1977 limitations set the minimum
level of control in order to achieve uniformity.
92. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sese. 34 (1972).
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intended, however, that the Agency discard the cost-benefit
analysis. 98 Instead, the Agency must only take costs into consideration in setting 1983 limitations, using a reasonableness
standard. 94
Section 40395 authorizes the Agency to regulate pollution
discharged into the ocean. This section includes all pollution discharged from any sewer outfall regardless of the distance from
the shoreline.96 To avoid undermining the scope of this section,
Congress stated that this section controls, notwithstanding any
legislation to the contrary.9?
Finally, section 511(c) was design~d to settle any conflict
which might arise between the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act.98 Section 511(c)
accomplishes this purpose by limiting the situations in which
the Agency must comply with the National Policy Act requirement of a Statement.D9 In essence, section 511(c) freed the
Agency's hands in its effort to ful:fill the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act's goals. loD

m.

CONCLUSION

In both Association of Pacific Fisheries and Kilroy, the
Ninth Circuit examined the legislative history of the Act in its
effort to fulfill the congressional intent for the challenged provisions. The Pacific Fisheries panel properly construed the costs
and data provisions of section 301 for both the "1977 and the
1983 limitations. The Kilroy court also correctly afforded section
511(c) a narrow construction. The Kilroy court, however, misconstrued section 403.
93. L.H. at 170. Congress intended that for 1983, no balancing test be required. See
also Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 295,
300 (1980).
94. Id. In determining what is reasonable, the Agency must evaluate what needs to
be done to help eliminate pollution discharge and what the available technology can
achieve, without regard to cost. Id.
'
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
96. L.H. at 177.
97.Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). See also note 6 supra.
99. See note 6 supra.
100. L.H. at 182.
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Congress intended that the Agency's power to regulate
ocean disposal of pollutants to be derived only from section
403. 101 The Kilroy court interpreted section 301 as the source of
this power and construed section 403 as a supplement to section
301. This interpretation frustrates the clear intent of Congress.
Fortunately, this misconstruction proved harmless because the
Kilroy court decided that the result would be the same under
either section. It should be noted, however, that section 301 is
not all encompassing. Congress intended that section 403 absolutely control ocean disposal, "any other legislation to the contrary notwithstanding."103 Further misinterpretations of congressional intent may be avoided by close examination of the
legislative history of individual provisions of the Act.
Robinson R. Ng*

101. See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text.
102. L.H. at 177. The district court found this absolute language may still give rise
to a "possibility that section 403 requirements ••• apply in addition to section 301's."
440 F. Supp. at 323. The language itself, however, appears not to allow this "possibility."
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
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